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The Experiment-based Knew-it-all-along Effect in the
Qualitative Light of Narrativity
Marek Palasinski
Lancaster University, Lancaster, Lancashire, United Kingdom
In contrast to the extant quantitative studies on the hindsight effect, the
present narrative analysis looks at it from a rare angle of talk-ininteraction. Fifty one-to-one interviews were done with five student
groups, each of which was presented with a scenario ending with one
factual outcome and three alternative outcomes that actually did not
happen. Confirming the already proven role of the provided event
outcome in overestimating the probability of its occurrence, this study
expands the current understanding of the processes neglected by the
research on the hindsight effect. It does so by highlighting the strategic
use of vagueness, self-empowerment and selective perspective-taking that
question the assessment of the past for its own sake and emphasize the
importance of self-presentation. Key Words: Decision Making, Hindsight
Effect, and Qualitative Research

The phenomenon whereby one overestimates the probability of a particular event
after one has learnt about it has been explored quantitatively for over three decades since
Baruch Fischhoff (1975) started looking into it. Known as the hindsight bias or knew-itall-along effect, it was found in miscellaneous settings, including political, business,
military and health-care spheres (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991). It appears
that even deliberate attempts to suppress it could ironically magnify its occurrence
(Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002) and that the difference between the hindsight effect in
specialists and laymen is rather small (Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004).
The current understanding of this effect assumes that consecutive events are
linked up causally via processes of cognitive reconstruction. According to this approach,
the information subjectively validating a particular ending is given prominence and the
data inconsistent with it is marginalized (Harley, Carlsen, & Loftus, 2004; Hawkins &
Hastie, 1990). This creates an illusion known as creeping determinism whereby a
particular course of the past seems to have been inexorable, leading one to overestimate
the likelihood of its occurrence (Hawkins & Hastie; Wasserman, Lempert, & Hestie,
1991). It also appears that the processes underlying creeping determinism are effortful
and that causal reasoning plays a big part in the perception of past events (Nestler, Blank,
& von Collani, 2008). Recently, it was even proposed that the hindsight effect is not a
unitary phenomenon and comprises three partially independent components: memory
distortions, impressions of forseeability and impressions of necessity (Blank, Nestler, von
Collani, & Fischer, 2008).
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The overwhelming majority of research on the hindsight effect, using cognitive
and motivational models (Blank, Musch, & Pohl, 2007)1, has been done by exploring
probability assessment as a practice of writing down particular percentage figures on
paper questionnaires without allowing participants to speak freely and ignoring their
verbal accounts. It was already found, however, that remembering and reasoning do not
have to be based on any alleged factuality and may serve a number of different functions,
like appealing to one’s personal interests or undermining other people’s competing
accounts (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992b). Thus, although people’s
descriptions of their hindsight judgments, their meanings and inferences might be
determined indexically, they have not been explored linguistically in any detail.
Given the “war of the worlds” between quantitative and qualitative methodologies
and the fundamentally different theoretical orientations they entail, it might be fair to ask
which side I stand on. Finding merit in both of them, I strive to adopt various methods to
different research problems. When investigating how historians and non-historians are
susceptible to the hindsight effect (no major differences were found), me and my
colleagues employed a quantitative method as it appeared to be most adequate to our
objective (Dymkowski, Domin, Marszalek, & Palasinski, 2007). Having been originally
trained mainly in quantitative methods and only later immersing myself in qualitative
methods, I was keen to see if and how the hindsight bias might happen in talk, thus
addressing at least a little bit of the striking absence of narrative research on this effect
and setting my work apart from the “mainstream” studies. Running this project alongside
my ongoing mixed methods PhD thesis on out-group helping, it was enlightening to come
back to the subject of my quantitative master thesis, the hindsight effect, and analyze it
from a qualitative angle.
I anticipated that exploring the hindsight effect by adopting a narrative approach
might shed new light on at least some of the traditional research on it and put it in a
somewhat different perspective without necessarily marginalizing its value. To put it
more precisely, as the hindsight effect is subject to variations, depending on the used
materials, types of feedback and methods of assessment (Rudiger, 2007), there are
grounds to suspect that spoken language might affect it in a way that is unfairly ignored.
One should bear in mind, though, that people’s cognitive processes may not be in direct
correspondence with what they say (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). Thus, the preference for
overestimating the probability of a specific outcome after it has happened might prompt
individuals to engage in activities that are not aimed at the assessment of the past for its
own sake. Rather than viewing cognitive distortions only as something that people have,
they can be also understood as purposeful narrative organizations that serve specific
functions in a social context, like mitigating sex offenders’ responsibility for their abuse
(Auburn & Lea, 2003). However, the question of whether such functionality would still
be evident in a less mundane context, which somewhat resembles the classical
quantitative research on the hindsight effect and thus stays in dialogue with that research,
was open.
Although people tend to make assessments using descriptive categories (e.g., very
unlikely) rather than numerical terms (Chard, 1991), a narrative account of past

1

Given the spatial limits of this paper, the more inquisitive reader is referred to the Special Issue on the
Hindsight Bias (2007) in Social Cognition, 25(1).
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evaluation from this angle has been ignored. Such ignoring appears to be unjustified as
qualitative methods hold the potential of providing extra insight that otherwise might be
out of reach (Seale, Gobo, Gubrium, & Silverman, 2004), like shedding light on distinct
discursive characteristics. As quantitative studies of the hindsight effect suggest that the
influence of motivational and emotional factors is generally marginal (Guilbaut et al.,
2004; Winman, 1999), such marginality has not been explored from a narrative angle and
this requires clarification. The problem with quantitative research is that in order to create
a world of variables that can be manipulated, concepts have to be fixed. Hence
quantitative methods are not the best at looking at the flexibility and context of
categorization. In contrast, narrative research has shown how categories can be used in
different ways at different times (Meinhof & Galasinski, 2005). This is particularly the
case in domains that can be said to be dilemmatic or involve uncertainty (Condor &
Gibson, 2007).
The recognition of such possible benefit, like a chance for examining the
formation of judgments, was made recently in a quantitative exploration of the hindsight
effect (Villejoubert, O’Keeffe, Alison, & Cole, 2006). As O’Doherty (2006) notes, a
qualitative approach to likelihood assessment has the potential to reveal linguistic
functions of probability estimates, giving insight into task construal processes in real time
decision making (Fischhoff, Welch, & Frederick, 1999). Since interviews can be
occasions for self-presentation to be managed discursively (Lee & Roth, 2004), adopting
a narrative approach might also help develop a model of motivated sense-making (Pezzo
& Pezzo, 2007). This model suggests that in hindsight people put a premium on
managing their image, not on looking for the most reasonable event causes, unless the
internal causes seem irrefutable. The clarification of how such management can be
achieved is another objective of this research that was designed to map out emergent
hindsight themes and their functionality in a context that was used in the early research
on this effect – a historical scenario.
Method
Materials
Drawing back on a classical theme of history used in the original study by
Fischhoff (1975), I used a factual story of the Great Northern War, presenting it in a way
that would make the victory on either side look equally plausible, so that the scales of
balance would not tip in any favor2. Although choosing a theme pertaining to people’s
ordinary concerns would be more relevant to normal and usual situations, it might also
create a greater risk of appealing directly to various personal experiences, potentially
influencing the preference for one ending. At the same time, I accept that the use of that
particular story does not eliminate that risk entirely and acknowledge that in this way the
insight into the contents of how people may talk about probability in their everyday lives
may be somewhat limited. The research on spoken language (McCarthy, 1998; Harnqvist,

2

The analysis of the narratives produced by the interviewees in the 0 Group confirms that this condition
was met.
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Christianson, Ridings, & Tingsell, 2003; Huang, Acero, & Hon, 2001), however,
suggests that the forms of their narratives would not have to be very different.
To minimize the possibility that my interviewees would favour one particular
outcome of the presented scenario over others, I strove to make it look little relevant to
their British national identity. Since Britishness has been found to be little connected to
Europeanness (Abell, Condor, & Stevenson, 2006; Fox, 2005), this lends support for
using a scenario set in mainland Europe. I anticipated that it would be unlikely if 50
female British University non-psychology and non-history students were familiar with
the Northern War that was waged in the early 18th century. Just in case, however, I asked
them all if they knew anything about it and none of them even admitted to hearing about
it.
Interviewees
Recognizing that psychology is sometimes criticized for using psychology
students as participants, I focus on non-psychology interviewees. The inclusion of
women is justified by the fact that most research on the hindsight effect is largely based
on responses given by young females (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Shwarz
& Stahlberg, 2003). Confined by the limits of this paper, I did not want to run the risk of
compromising the analysis of any possible gender differences. I acknowledge, though,
that such potential differences might be important and may deserve separate and more
exclusive exploration elsewhere.
Data Collection Procedure
In a process approved by the Lancaster University Institutional Review Board, I
informally approached individual students on a university campus, introduced myself as
doing research on how people assess the past and asked them if they could take part in a
10-minute task of historical evaluation. Upon consent, I asked the students to read the
presented scenario (Appendix A) and asked for permission to have their answers voicerecorded. I also advised them to take their time and mention anything that might come to
their minds only when they were ready to speak. I emphasized the entirely voluntary and
anonymous character of the study and advised them that if they felt uncomfortable at any
point, they could terminate it.
Similarly to the original 1975 questionnaire study by Fischhoff, in this research
there were five nominal groups, whose individual members were presented with different
story endings. Apart from the 0 Group, which was provided with no specific ending, all
the other groups were advised that the given historical scenario ended with respectively:
Swedish victory, military stalemate and military stalemate without any peace agreement.
Only one of the five ten-people groups was provided with the real ending of the conflict –
Russian victory.
After reading the historical scenario, they could familiarize themselves with the
following projective questions that were meant to minimize potential impression
management processes:
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1. Which of the four endings would most students judge as the most likely
and why? What would they take into account?
2. Which of the four endings would most students judge as the least likely
and why? What would they take into account?
All the six to ten minute interviews were conducted one to one with the given
groups intact. Each person in each nominal group was interviewed separately from the
other group members, so that, like in most research on the hindsight effect, they could not
communicate with one another. I did not interrupt my interviewees, did not make any
comments and did not engage in any discussion during the voice-recorded interaction.
Being an active listener, my role was limited to repeating any of the above questions that
they did not answer and to encouraging them to justify their responses, unless such
justification was spontaneous. I then thanked, debriefed and informed interviewees of the
real historical ending.
Data Analysis
To start with, it seemed worthwhile examining the spoken responses in terms of
how frequently particular endings were selected. It is indispensable, however, to mention
that what was counted as answers in my study, were only the first responses that
interviewees gave. Thus, any later changes in their answers were not taken into account
here as questionnaires used in the research on the hindsight effect do not allow
participants to modify their first answers. This imposes rigid theoretical constraints and
limits the possibility of self-expression, which might be minimized if a narrative
approach is adopted.
Given that in the hindsight research tradition the focus has been mainly on how
participants respond to the given questionnaire, I took into consideration a narrative
approach where my role would also be rather passive. Aiming to focus primarily on the
verbalized responses to a questionnaire-resembling prompt, rather than on the interaction
with me or on the conversational flow, I chose the method of textual thematic analysis
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). It must be mentioned that unlike discourse analysis, for instance,
this method can be more prone to less accurate functional linguistic interpretation of talk.
This, in turn, poses a risk of overlooking contextual consistencies and informative
paradoxes across independent accounts (Seale et al., 2004). However, as discourse
analysis also deals with the conversational interaction between people, it could be seen as
less relevant to this research, where I did not get involved in discussing the research
material. Considering the possibility of subjecting the individual narrative responses to
consistent intra and intergroup comparisons, the thematic analysis is good at mapping out
homogeneous and contrasting strands across the whole data set. Its flexibility also offers
a whole spectrum of analytic pathways to choose from (Braun & Clarke).
The transcription of the produced narratives was based on the standards suggested
by Jefferson (1987)3. Relying on quoting no more than one chosen account by individual

3

(.) denotes a pause < one second; (2) denotes a timed pause in seconds; italicised text represents emphasis;
“hhh” represents an audible intake of breath; equals sign between turns “=” represent no discernible gap
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interviewees, only those excerpts were selected that reflect the main strands of the whole
without going over the same elements or editing them. By the same token, the structure
of this paper was meant to be kept both dynamic and bereft of repetitious fragments.
Such selection, however, was not arbitrary as it was based on the requirement that any
germane narrative properties would be represented consistently in similar cases. This was
confirmed by two independent raters, 3rd year undergraduate psychology students, who
also helped to calculate the frequency of each theme by scanning the whole transcript for
coherent clusters of individual references making up the discerned themes. The clusters
were subsequently cross-compared, so that their sizes could be juxtaposed against one
another and their combined whole.
Prior to examining the interviews from the angle of textual thematic analysis, I
had to break up each entire transcript into coherent numbered units that were defined by
change of subject. I then inspected them for consistent informational threads that could be
woven together into themes, whose identification might help to capture some of the
essential processes involved in “doing” hindsight. The number of such discerned themes
was then brought down to fewer and progressively more succinct themes that were
systematically checked back with the transcript and cross-examined between and within
the interviews. To identify their reliability levels, the two raters were given access to the
themes to numerically code 90 items chosen from the interviews and comprising 30% of
all units (N=300). It is important to clarify the term agreement defined by allocating one
item to the same thematic category. Such agreement was found in coding on 89.8% of the
items between the researcher and Rater 1, on 92.3% of the items between the researcher
and Rater 2, and on 82.2% of the items between Rater 1 and Rater 2.
I did not want my exploration, however, to be limited just to theme identification.
I was also interested in the thematic contents and in how both direct and indirect
references comprising the discerned themes might create new possible meanings and
what functional implications for impression management might stem from them.
Therefore, during the theme identification, I made efforts to analyze their strategic
functions, (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2008; Hardy, Palmer, & Phillips, 2000), so that
the hindsight effect might be examined from the angle of what people do rather than what
happens to them (Antaki, 2006; Auburn & Lea, 2003).
The calls for mixed research methods (Holloway & Jefferson, 2000; Johnson,
Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007; Symon, Cassell, & Dickson, 2001) lend further support
for the employed methodology, although I acknowledge that using it might contrast some
epistemological positions that may not necessarily appear to be in perfect tune with one
another. However, “squabbles on the margins” (Levinson, 2006, p.85) might be less
important here in light of the evidence that diverse approaches can be more illuminating
than the more monolithic ones, especially as they can reveal the contradictory and
intertwined subtleties of life experiences (Brannen, 2008; Jackson, 2005; Mertens, 2004).
Adopting one single theory of language might indeed appear to be more methodically
consistent, but doing so may potentially limit the breadth of the overall analysis without
necessarily increasing its depth. Blank et al. (2007) caution that no single theory can
explain the hindsight effect as most likely multiple processes are involved. While
appreciating the value of elegantly packaged theoretical accounts, Mason (2006) also
argues that multi-dimensional research can help us “think outside the box”, revealing
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more intersecting dimensions of social experience and enhancing the logic of qualitative
explanations.
Data Interpretation
The produced narrative responses show the clear presence of the hindsight effect
in three out of four groups (Appendix B), which is overall consistent with the existing
and growing literature on this effect (Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990;
Wasserman et al., 1991). They also suggest that the effect does not only show up in
traditional “pen and paper” research, but can be also evident in talk. The likely reason for
such results could be the presentation of the historical story in a way that would not
strongly suggest any of the provided endings.
The plausibility of this explanation is increased if one considers the most diverse
narrative responses made by the 0 Group interviewees during the assessment of the most
likely ending. Here four people chose Swedish victory, three people selected Russian
victory, two people went for military stalemate, and one person chose military stalemate
without any peace agreement.
This confirms that in general the presented scenario does not swing the odds in
favor of one particular ending. This is also illustrated by the following narratives4:
1.1.Sweden became the largest military power (2) but they lost the food
supplies (2)
1.2.But then the Russian hhh on the other hand (.) they came sort of good
as well (.)
1.3.So it’s like spread even.
2.1 But there is nothing that swings in favor (2) that either won
3.1.Because it seems to give quite an even account of both sides (2) people
would
3.2.Think they were quite evenly matched.
It must be mentioned, though, that when the ending categories are collapsed into
“victory (7 people)” and “stalemate (3 people)”, it becomes clear that even in the 0 Group
there was a strong selection preference. It is suspected that the stalemate was probably
interpreted here as a less complete ending, hence becoming a seemingly less definite
conclusion than either’s side triumph. Although most interviewees chose other endings
than military stalemate or military stalemate without any peace agreement, their
narratives still give away their inclination to describe the situation as more well-balanced
rather than one-sided. This is evident in their use of disclaimer “but” (1.2, 2.1) that might
also serve as a strategic rhetorical device. Despite this telltale “but”, which may well
reflect their hesitation or caution, as opposed to all the other four groups, the 0 Group
interviewees were not changing their answers much. A possible reason for that could be
the paucity of any definite ending that the other groups were provided with. In other
words, once the 0 Group interviewees made up their minds and selected particular

4

The first digit symbolizes consecutive interviewees; the second represents their individual accounts.
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endings as the most plausible, they did not have to deal with any additional interfering
factors, like the concluding passage.
Emerging Narrative Themes
Theme 1: The construed agentic role of the provided ending. Selective focusing
on the units of information corroborating the particular given ending was not uncommon
in any of the four groups (1.1.1, 1.2.3, 1.3.1)5, tying in with the foreseeability impression
component of the 3 subphenomenon hindsight effect model (Blank et al., 2008). Neither
was ignoring other information that could suggest a different outcome from the one that
was provided. As meaning-creating selectivity allows for the self-flattering belief in
control and prediction, it is noteworthy that although the final provided ending was often
described as counterintuitive (1.2.1, 1.3.1), its role was still presented as profound
anyway (1.2.3). Using that provided ending might give away informational conformity
(the need to be right) or little engagement in the analysis of the story. Its prominence and
availability could also have made choosing an alternative ending a socially risky and
potentially embarrassing act despite the interviews being anonymous:
1.1.1. Because that’s already in the passage (2) it seems to flow
1.2.1. I feel it was quite persuasive though in almost making me choose
Swedish
1.2.2. victory (.) so (2) just because of all that saying about Sweden and
its leader (2)
1.2.3. but just the final bit about the Russians made me change my mind
1.3.1. I don’t particularly agree with it (sigh) but it feels like a natural
ending
Unlike the responses obtained in the mainstream cannon of research on the
hindsight effect, the narrative accounts seem to pertain to emotion rather than to
cognition. In contrast to questionnaire studies, they allow for greater insight into how
people can construe such a cognitive-emotional dilemma, sometimes verbally contrasting
their feelings with what they might actually think otherwise (1.3.1). Although the reliance
on the provided ending might be also interpreted as a form of availability heuristic6,
whose importance in the hindsight effect has already been recognized quantitatively
(Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff et al., 1999), how it can be expressed in hindsight talk to
what end (1.1.1, 1.2.1) seems to be neglected in the research on this effect.
Disclaimers like, “I don’t particularly agree with it” (1.3.1) present the
interviewee as an independent thinker and might serve the role of face-saving, should her
answer be incorrect, whereas the audible sigh gives away the problematic nature of the
pending decision. In other words, the potential inference that she is not able to draw any
5

The first digit refers to the given theme, the second symbolizes consecutive interviewees within one
theme, and the third represents their individual accounts.
6
A mental shortcut whereby people use a value as a reference point and then adjust insufficiently from this
anchor.
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conclusion herself is undermined or counteracted. Rather than simply confirming the
provided ending as being the most likely, interviewees set up the conditions for plausible
deniability. In other words, they indirectly deny the potentially attributable motive of
taking the easiest way and cutting corners to confirm the seemingly obvious provided
ending. They achieve this by using emotionally-charged categories “I feel” (1.2.1) or “It
feels” (1.3.1), which can get them somewhat exempted from the responsibility for their
judgments, constructing the actual final wording of the story as almost making those
judgments for them. Edwards (1997) proposes that when exploring how different
versions of events and their functionality are constructed, one should consider a whole
range of employed linguistic and rhetorical devices, including how people adopt their
positions to what is said.
This implies that the emotional categories might be considered here as
argumentative resources that can safely reposition interviewees as only semi-active in
their decision making, which appears to be heavily affected by the constructed agentic
role of the provided ending. The construction of that role, however, is very subtle.
Although its importance is stated unequivocally, it is always framed in a way that creates
the impression of tying in with the whole of the story. It also provides a defensible
inference allowing the interviewee to claim that choosing the provided ending is not
coincidental, but appears to be a logical and natural conclusion. Reliability raters 1 and 2
were in 86% and 90% agreement with the researcher on this theme; the references
comprising this theme represent 38% of all the four identified thematic references in the
whole transcript.
Theme 2: The creation of vague and changeable answers in hindsight. As
participants in the research on the hindsight effect are usually given no option of
amending their answers, unless they cross them out and write down new figures, their
opportunities for self-expression are clearly limited. In light of the below narratives, such
practice turns out to ignore the verbal fuzziness of active probability assessment making.
Far from appearing homogenous and firm, as quantitative literature on the hindsight
effect suggests, the narrative post factum past evaluation appears to be diverse and not
infrequently hesitant, which somewhat corresponds to the memory distortion component
of the 3 subphenomenon model (Blank et al., 2008).
It is also noteworthy that in contrast to the 0 Group, interviewees provided with a
specific ending of the given scenario were using more vague discourse, which questions
the assumption that having access to the event outcome must lead to rather confident and
definite judgments as it is suggested by the mainstream research on this effect (Blank et
al., 2007). It seems that enacting the hindsight effect entails the use of language that
appears to be more equivocal. One of the main challenges here was to capture, describe,
and thus to better comprehend such hindsight fuzziness:
2.1.1. Actually I might be wrong now (.) the Swedes had bad food
supplies (.) I might
2.1.2. change my answer to the first question actually (.) cos the Russians
seemed
2.1.3. like they had a better (2) maybe the Swedish won the first couple
of (.) I dunno
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2.2.1. I don’t know (sigh) because the Russians (.) it says they were
highly motivated
2.2.2. so it could possibly be a military stalemate as well
These above narratives illustrate how complex on-the-spot probability assessment
making can be and how the chosen individual pieces of information are strung together
into various meaning-making patterns. Such undecidability also represents a flow of
active real-time engagement and shows an array of potentially face-saving hedging
devices, like “I might be wrong now” (2.1.1), “maybe” (2.1.3) or “I don’t know” (2.2.1).
These devices can license a potential inaccuracy and help maintain control over the
interaction by changing the focus of the asked question. In other words, the open
admission of possibly making a mistake, being ignorant or simply guessing serves the
role of a safety net. It offers some level of protection against running both informational
and social risk of being wrong, appearing incompetent or even foolish. Perhaps more
importantly, the emerging responses are almost always justified and the chosen
arguments might also act as inoculation against impugning them.
Such “I dunno” (2.1.3, 2.2.1) formulations do not have to be treated as simple
markers of uncertainty or limited knowledge as they might be treated as argumentative
resources performing work in talk-in-interaction. Thus, they might give away lack of
interest in the given scenario or even imply that its details do not deserve paying attention
to. It is worth considering such formulations as ways of distancing speakers from having
to make sensitive decisions that might potentially lead to pejorative judgments about
them (Edwards, 1995; Wooffitt, 2005). Such processes have not been explored in-depth
in the questionnaire research on the hindsight effect. When looked into as a whole, the
individual accounts might even seem contradictory, yet their logical continuity is clearly
held up and puts interviewees in a position enabling them to safely adopt various
consecutive and sometimes mutually-exclusive views:
2.3.1. It easily could’ve been stalemate (2) or stalemate without peace
agreement (2)
2.3.2. they’re quite likely hhh but obviously it could’ve been Swedish (.)
but it says in
2.3.3. bold at the end it’s Russian
The quoted example illustrates that the unfixed and indefinite responses obtained
in a hindsight effect task (2.3.1, 2.3.2) can represent a very dynamic practice in talk that
might help to clarify more fully what it is people do when they are engaged in probability
assessment. The possible reasons for such elusiveness and changeability of the produced
judgments could pertain to impression management processes as under uncertainty it
much safer to give ambiguous answers (Galasinski, 2003; Shuy, 1998). This explanation
would appear plausible all the more as one could get away with such equivocation and
yet still provide an explanation that cannot be logically incorrect (2.3.1). It is noteworthy
that the produced response (2.3.1) only appears to answer the original question about the
most likely ending, but it actually does not and instead it relies on “covert evasion”
(Galasinski, p.60). In other words, the character of that response being weak in
commitment and lacking informativeness indirectly distances its author from her non-
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specific answer that might be created so as to persuade the interviewer to accept it as
specific enough. Reliability raters 1 and 2 were in 80% and 82% agreement with the
researcher on this theme; the references comprising this theme represent 21% of all the
identified thematic references in the whole transcript.
Theme 3: The focus on hindsight self-empowerment. The presentation of
oneself as an independent thinker was consistent in all the groups, albeit to a lesser
degree in the 0 Group. Thus, in the four groups the produced narratives contain safe, yet
non-specific answers, many of which highlight the very interactive nature of the task.
This indicates that people can play an active and strategic role in endowing the given task
with a new interpretation, which apparently cannot be entirely isolated from its social
context. The explicit mention that the researcher had some expectations (3.1.1) appears to
be in tune with the necessity impression component of the 3 subphenomenon model
(Blank et al., 2008). Here it underscores that the probability assessor does not have to be
a passive respondent confined strictly by the assigned particular task, suggesting that the
interactive contact with the researcher should not be underestimated in hindsight
research:
3.1.1. I don’t really know (sigh) what I am meant to say
One possible explanation of this “hedge-your-bets” strategy might be selfpresentational avoidance of committing oneself to one specific and potentially risky
answer. Another explanation could also pertain to the depth of one’s individual analysis,
depending on the spent time and paid attention, which is illustrated by the following
quotes:
3.2.1. But if I were to go through it again (.) maybe (2) and pick up
various areas of strength for each country
3.3.1. And they’ve got more (2) more forces (.) oh no! Russians got more
forces (.)
3.3.2. I don’t know (2) but I suppose it’s difficult to really distinguish
3.4.1. Well (2) I’d take my knowledge into account (2) I don’t really
have any (laugh)
These narratives show that people can present themselves as being well aware of
the influence time and attention can have on their own likelihood evaluation judgments
(3.2.1, 3.3.1). It is also apparent that they do not have to present themselves as shy about
their ignorance or coy about struggling to reach some conclusion (3.3.2, 3.4.1). On the
contrary, they can effectively ward off such potential criticism by redefining the social
context in terms of an entertaining game rather than some serious likelihood assessment
task. The produced exclamation (3.3.1) and laugh (3.4.1), for instance, minimize such
seriousness, giving it a character of fun that hence might be trivialized and challenging
the experimental assumption that participants usually approach the given hindsight task
as seriously as the researcher would like them to.
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Effort to present oneself as reasonable was manifest as well, turning the rhetorical
tables on the researcher by letting him know that the four provided endings to choose
from are not good enough to allow for self-expression:
3.5.1. What would make a logical sense (2) I think would be the answer
The active verb “think” emphasizes the interviewee’s independent role, thus
indirectly questioning the constructed restrictive character of the prompt. Apparently,
people can actively protest against being given just a limited number of available options
without any room for flexibility and subtlety:
3.6.1. And I don’t know (2) you can’t necessarily categorize whether or
not they had
3.6.2. peace agreement (2) cos hhh it is just too complex to say yes or no
This again turns the rhetorical tables on the researcher and actually questions his
practice, subtly transforming the interactional landscape. The pronoun “you” (3.6.1)
reduces the social distance between him and the interviewee, redefining him like an
equal, not any authority figure to be simply listened to or obeyed. It adds facticity to the
generalizable nature of the produced account, empowering the interviewee with a sense
of agency and control over the given hindsight task. The unambiguous evaluation of the
available ending options as being too crude and rigid (3.6.2) puts them under a question
mark, almost implying that the researcher should actually learn how to do research from
the interviewee, thus changing the balance of power and competence. Reliability raters 1
and 2 were in 75% and 84% agreement with the researcher on this theme; the references
comprising this theme represent 29% of all the identified thematic references in the
whole transcript.
Theme 4: The engagement in selective perspective-taking in hindsight. As
opposed to traditional research on the hindsight effect, the narrative approach also seems
to allow for greater understanding of how the probability assessor can tendentiously
adopt the position of others. It turns out that the given task could be approached as a full
interactive role-play that did not have to be simply limited to the provided information.
Apparently, interviewees could go beyond its confines and spontaneously engage in
meaningful inferences about the presented characters’ motives. Applying ad hoc, readymade theories of the human mind to explain the provided scenario ending was clear too
(4.1.1):
4.1.1. So stalemate wouldn’t really be an issue for those fighting for
something
4.1.2. (2) for something they consider their motherland
A form of the narrative organization “I was just doing X…when Y”, which was
already identified in an analysis of paranormal experiences (Wooffitt, 2005), can be
discerned in lines 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Here, however, it takes shape of “No Y…whey they
are just doing X”. Wooffitt argues that this kind of organization constructs a specific
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version of reality, entailing a set of implications about the speaker’s stake by increasing
the credibility of the described events. Here the used script formulation about the fight for
the motherland performs functions that are not just relevant to the speaker. Whereas
Auburn and Lea (2003) show how this narrative device assigns motive and responsibility
to other individuals, in my study it is apparent that a similar process can apply to grouplevel characters that do not even have to exist or be familiar.
In contrast, the narratives in the 0 Group do not indicate that interviewees got
engaged in that kind of sophistication to justify their answers. This implies that having
access to the event outcome and assessing its likelihood of occurrence might facilitate the
tendentious adoption of others’ perspectives as long as they tie in with the given event
outcome. Although this process dovetails with the hindsight literature on sense-making
(Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007), causal attribution (Ash, 2009; Wasserman et al., 1991) and the
memory distortion component of the 3 subphenomenon model (Blank et al., 2008), the
classical hindsight effect questionnaire does not capture the dynamics of such perspective
adoption. Its verbalization might be considered as an argumentative resource, making the
produced response seem to be more justified and persuasive. A script formulation of
other people making a similar probability evaluation was mentioned as well, so that the
selection of a less complicated outcome was justified by the assumed human intolerance
of uncertainty:
4.2.1. Because people quite like to have a conclusion (.) with something
(2) if they’re
4.2.2. trying to find an answer to that hhh they would be disinclined to go
with D
Revealingly, the genalizability of the reached inferences transcended the
characters featuring in the presented scenario. All this belies the image of respondents as
passive participants who would be unlikely to engage in the role of an amateur
psychologist. Although most quantitative studies on the hindsight effect recognize the
representativeness heuristic7 (Winman, 1999), they do not show how it can be actively
used by respondents evaluating past events. The present study demonstrates that it could
be the popular non-historical image that is used to evaluate the past and justify the given
answers. The fact that such image could have been different at the time of the described
situation was ignored. Instead, availability and vividness of events or states, like the
Soviet Victory over the Nazis, were employed as good enough reference points to bolster
the argument for choosing the given ending that happened over three hundred years ago
(4.3.1, 4.3.2):
4.3.1. They keep on going until they get what they want (2) it’s that
Russians don’t
4.3.2. (2) that Russians don’t back down easily

7

A mental shortcut whereby people classify things and people according to how similar they are to a
typical case.
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If history was referred to, it was always European history. This could be the result
of both anchoring the presented story in the Old World and the most accessible historical
knowledge, highlighting the importance of familiarity with the cultural themes, which is
predominantly ignored by the mainstream experimental work on the hindsight effect.
This implies that probably different kinds of representations would be used if the scenario
setting was more exotic, thus leading to different discourse. As opposed to the
questionnaire methods used in the research on the hindsight effect, the adopted mixed
methods approach allows for some insight into the influence of peripheral associations,
like those engendered by the media (4.4.1), on the evaluation of the past:
4.4.1. You know (2) cos sometimes (.) you know that film 300 that came
out (2) it’s
4.4.2. quite similar to that (.) it’s like a small army against a larger army
It is worth bearing in mind that the interviews were done in April 2007 - before
the mediacised Russian resumption of the Soviet-era long-distance flights of strategic
bombers in August 2007, and well before the Russian invasion of Georgia in August
2008. One can suspect that if similar interviews using the same scenario were done later,
these highly publicized events would be likely to lead to more voices favoring the
Russian victory. This ties in with the existing literature suggesting that the media can
bear heavily on discourse (Fitzgerald, 1991; Garrett & Bell, 1998), behavior and
judgments (Giles, 2003), which might affect the perception of others’ position. On the
one hand, the present example might again be seen by cognitivists as a form of
availability heuristic whose role in the process creeping determinism has already been
recognized. On the other hand, however, in contrast to classical questionnaire
approaches, the contribution it brings implies that such informational availability does not
have to be embedded in the presented text of the given hindsight task.
It seems that its influence is much more extensive and can involve mere
subjective associations with the presented scenario, which might somewhat question the
concept of experimental objectivity that is strived for in the laboratory. Rather than
looking at the recall of the ancient battle (4.4.1) in cognitive terms, one should consider
its interactional role (Edwards, 1997) in justifying the produced answer and increasing its
credibility. What deserves attention here is the rhetorical way the American movie
blockbuster about the ancient Greek battle was used to favor the odds of smaller military
forces. Inoculating expressions of time, like “sometimes” or “quite similar” (4.4.1, 4.4.2),
might serve the purpose of making it more difficult to cast doubt over the sensibility of
the given judgment (Galasinski, 2003). This again hints at the importance of impression
management and highlights the role of the often-ignored social context in probability
assessment tasks. Reliability raters 1 and 2 were in 78% and 83% agreement with the
researcher on this theme; the references comprising this theme represent 12% of all the
identified thematic references in the whole transcript.
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Conclusions
The objective of this research was to explore how the experience of hindsight past
evaluation can be expressed in talk without the usual experimental “pen and paper”
constraints. The explanations produced by interviewees give away their active
engagement in the search for meaning and order, the needs that have also been identified
as fundamental to making sense of existence (Baumeister, 1992). It is also probable that
such narrative strategies help keep their self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997) in predicting
events high, bolstering their illusory control over chance-determined events (Crocker,
1982). They support the existing literature that judgments are much influenced by initial
expectations and self-serving interpretations (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Nisbett & Ross,
1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 2002). Most of them also back up the creeping determinism
hypothesis (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Wasserman et al., 1991).
As Wooffitt (2005) argues that identity ascriptions are fluid, variable and
occasioned, my contribution demonstrates that the produced verbal assessments of the
past in hindsight are of a similar character, which is in contrast with questionnaire studies
suggesting that the availability of the given outcome leads to a rather definite and
confident judgement. My paper also shows that in evaluating the past people can get
engaged in activities that have little to do with any accurate analysis of what happened. It
adds to the growing literature on fact construction and memory (Edwards & Potter,
1992a; Lynch, 2006; Middleton & Edwards, 1990), pointing out that such construction
can be a functional tool to get across personal meanings that seem to be more relevant to
their creators than to more impartial analysts of history.
Auburn and Lea (2003) show how speakers use strategic narrative organizations
to assign motive, responsibility and morality to individual characters. My analysis brings
to light how plastic and dynamic such assignment can be with regards to groups, which
also depends on the given context (scenario ending). Whereas Auburm and Lea illustrate
how created descriptions in doing cognitive distortions are oriented to counteracting or
pre-empting alternative version of events, my research finds that speakers can easily
engage in doing the reverse. “Hedging one’s bets” by voicing such alternative versions
can be clearly in their interest, for instance, to appear thoughtful or to safely ward off the
potential criticism that one definite answer might provoke. This ties in with the so called
creation of chronology in reverse (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 170):
Looking back from the conclusion to the episodes leading up to it, we
have to be able to say that this ending required these sorts of events and
this chain of actions.
Although interviewees presented with the specific endings tended to focus on the
tendentious causal linking of particular events, their narratives also clearly point out the
importance of other processes. They include the production of equivocal answers, selfempowerment and selective perspective-taking, all of which were shown to serve
multiple purposes in the immediate social context at hand. Such staying on the “safe
side” by giving non-committal answers minimizes the risk of making an error and preempts the potential embarrassment it might cause. McLure (2003, p. 171) aptly notes
that:
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…subjects sometimes act up, make self-conscious jokes, contradict
themselves, adopt different masks (without necessarily knowing that they
are masks; or that there are only masks), forge their own signatures, and
deflect researchers’ agendas. And that this is an entirely unexceptional
(but not at all uninteresting) part of any person’s repertoire of interactional
strategies and, indeed, ways of “Being”.
It seems that active elaboration of the produced narratives, their recasting or
cautionary modification should not be ignored. Such potentially embarrassment-reducing
use of equivocation (Bello & Edwards, 2005) in post factum probability assessment
appears to be far from negligible. It shows that depending on the empirical method, the
given responses in hindsight can be dynamic and sometimes even vague rather than
definite and static, like questionnaires find them, lending further support to the value of
mixed methods research.
Redefining the whole research situation by putting emphasis on one’s active role
shows that people can skilfully reposition themselves as meaning-creating beings that are
not willing to be held back by the confines of the given hindsight task and its implicitly
imposed rules, which is in contrast to questionnaire-based answers. This lends support to
the hypothesis that impression management may indeed underlie avoiding personal
responsibility in hindsight, extending the model of motivated sense-making (Pezzo &
Pezzo, 2007). It seems that impression management in hindsight does not have to pertain
to appearing knowledgeable or competent. The presentation of one’s ignorance or
disinterest (dunnos) can be equally important, just like the strategy of equivocation, wit
or turning the rhetorical tables on the researcher through self-empowerment and
reformulation of the given situation.
It appears that the likelihood assessor can be far from a passive subject who
cannot go beyond the space-time imposed by the researcher. It appears that the assessor
can spontaneously become an active reality co-creator, giving a completely new meaning
to the probability evaluation task, even if the research setting is not entirely natural.
Therefore, it is arguable that all this should be kept in mind when interpreting the
classical questionnaire-based research on the hindsight effect, which apparently should
not be treated as done with neutral tools in a vacuum of social context.
It also turns out that at least in the probability assessment of a historical scenario,
people may well be able to defy its featuring time scale. Not only can they consider later
events, but they can also move back and consider much earlier happenings or even try to
generate laws of history. It looks that the narrative fallacy (Taleb, 2007), the tendency to
create stories around selected available facts, can play a notable role in doing the
hindsight effect. Such sense of self-empowerment is also evident in the selective
verbalization of others’ perspectives, which emphasizes again the creative role that
people can spontaneously adopt in making meanings and transcending the conceptual
limits of the given hindsight task.
Highlighting the findings that would otherwise have not come out if the classical
approach to the hindsight bias had been adopted alone and analysing them in dialogue
with the data obtained in traditional ways has clear implications for promoting mixed
methods research in general. It might potentially inspire new directions in combining
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methods (Morgan, 2007) or perhaps influence some single methods practitioners to grow
more open-minded to such practice or at least become less hostile to it as it is still all too
often met with barriers of disapproval and prejudice (Bryman, 2007). Alas, such barriers
still hold out, slowing down and sometimes holding up research progress, which is
evident for example in the spectacular and unfair absence of mixed methods research on
the hindsight effect, although it has already been explored for over three decades.
A few words of caution about the limitations of my study are due too. The
particular nature of the interaction, together with the place and specificity of the given
task should caution against automatic generalizability of the drawn conclusions to nonhistorical, geographically closer and more personally relevant probability assessment
situations. As with most research, so should the potential bias stemming from my own
preconceptions and the used prompt. Thus, the present study does not represent a
comprehensive list of all emergent themes and self-presentational strategies that can
come up in doing hindsight. Neither do I argue that similar themes and contents would
not be necessarily found in other thinking-requiring tasks. Avoiding staking claims to any
grand narratives and universal truths about evaluating the past in hindsight, all my
contribution offers is a context-depending polyphony of voices, which according to
Lincoln and Guba (2000) is all we can really aim at.
I would also like to be mention that the qualitative-quantitative divide may not
always be clear and that rather than joining different data and methods it might be better
to think in terms of meshing or linking them in a mutually illuminating way (Mason,
2006), which is more likely to be productive (Bazeley, 2009). Future challenges might
further address this issue by focusing on the “knew-it-all-along” effect in other types of
scenarios and contexts, for instance in tasks closer to people’s interests or expertise.
Comparative gender analyses would not be just a cliché as little is known how women’s
talk in hindsight would differ from men’s in vagueness, functionality or form of
employed explanatory strategies.
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Appendix A
The Great Northern War was fought between Sweden and other northern European
powers. At stake was control of the Baltic Sea and the lands around it. In 1700, Sweden
was attacked by Denmark, Saxony, Poland and Russia. Sweden’s Charles XII was only
18 and his enemies hoped to take advantage of his inexperience. But Charles proved to
be a skillful leader. He won the battle at Narva in Estonia, which enabled Sweden to
force Saxony, Poland and Denmark out of the war and put a new king on the Polish
throne. Sweden became the largest military power in Northern Europe and eight years
later Charles invaded Ukraine. The bitter winter of 1708-09 was crippling the Swedish
food supplies and highly motivated Russians adopted the technique of scorched earth.
The final outcome of the war was decided by the battle of Poltava where more
experienced Swedish military fought a more numerous Russian forces protecting their
motherland (0 Group - uninformed of the conclusion), which ended with
Swedish victory (1st Group)
Russian victory (2nd Group)
Military stalemate (3rd Group)
Military stalemate without any peace agreement (4th Group)
A) Swedish victory
B) Russian victory
C) Military stalemate
D) Military stalemate without peace agreement
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Appendix B
Table 1. Frequency Figures for the Most Likely Endings
First
Group

Second
Group

Third
Group

Fourth
Group

Swedish
Victory

7

3

2

4

Russian
Victory

3

6

2

2

Military
Stalemate

0

1

6

1

0

0

0

3

Military
Stalemate
without Peace
Agreement

Table 2. Frequency Figures for the Least Likely Endings
First
Group

Second
Group

Swedish
Victory

1

1

3

4

Russian
Victory

2

1

2

2

Military
Stalemate

4

6

2

2

3

2

3

2

Military
Stalemate
without Peace
Agreement

Third
Group

Fourth
Group
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